Türkiye's Israel Trade Ban Faces an Oil Test: Ceyhan Shipments Hit Three-Year High

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government says it cut all direct trade with Israel in May 2024. Yet Israel continued to receive a major share of its imported crude through a pipeline terminating at Türkiye's Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Reuters reported in January 2026 that Israeli imports of Azerbaijani oil from Ceyhan climbed 31% in 2025 to approximately 94,000 barrels per day, a three-year high. That discrepancy has become a central question for activists who want an energy embargo to match Ankara's political condemnation of Israel's actions in Gaza.

Reuters based the finding on tanker intelligence from Kpler and other maritime-data providers. Azerbaijani crude supplied 46.4% of Israel's oil imports in 2025, according to Kpler figures in the report. The crude originates in Azerbaijan and reaches the Turkish coast through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Its route through Türkiye does not mean that the oil was owned or sold by the Turkish government.

The embargo is real—and the pipeline distinction is real

The Turkish Trade Ministry reiterated in March 2026 that it had halted imports, exports, free-zone transactions and transit trade with Israel, arguing that customs records show no bilateral trade since May 2, 2024. Ankara also says its state-run pipeline operator BOTAŞ International has no control over commercial sales of Azerbaijani crude and that the pipeline operates under international agreements signed with Azerbaijan and Georgia.

These claims concern different stages of a shipment. A customs embargo can make direct trade illegal without giving the transit state ownership of third-country oil. Oil landed at Ceyhan is not automatically listed as a Turkish export to Israel in customs data. This distinction should prevent the unsupported assertion that every barrel received by Israel was sold by Erdoğan's administration.

But it does not make the infrastructure question disappear. If the public purpose of Ankara's Israel embargo is to exert economic pressure, policymakers must explain why crude passing through a major Turkish port can continue to supply Israeli refineries on such a large scale. Legal limits and treaty obligations deserve explanation; so do the choices available to a government publicly promising an economic break.

Shipping data challenge the public narrative

Reuters reported that tankers taking oil from Ceyhan to Israel have sometimes switched off their tracking systems or signalled other destinations. Maritime analyst Vortexa identified an Aframax shipment of 680,000 barrels of Azerbaijani Light crude discharged in Israel in January 2026. Reuters described a separate ship that loaded at Ceyhan and was tracked by Kpler to Israel's Ashkelon port after its automatic identification signal went dark.

In October, Turkish Minute reported that Azerbaijani news agency APA had published and later removed a separate report alleging eleven visits to Israeli ports by six Turkey-linked cargo vessels in September. That account involves cargo ships, not necessarily Azerbaijani oil tankers, and its removed original report has not been independently confirmed here. It adds to calls for transparent shipping records, but should not be confused with the more extensive Reuters tanker-data findings.

Türkiye's Energy Ministry rejected allegations in November 2024 that it was allowing oil shipments to Israel, saying companies shipping crude through Ceyhan respected the trade halt. Its March 2026 trade statement again described claims of continued direct trade as false. The fact that Türkiye denies commercial responsibility must appear alongside the evidence of the oil's actual destination.

The accountability question is not solved by slogans

Criticism of Israeli policy and solidarity with Palestinians have been prominent in Erdoğan's rhetoric. A genuine accounting would publish clear destination rules, explain what ship-tracking and customs data measure, disclose the state's treaty commitments, and identify any lawful steps available to prevent energy supply from undermining declared sanctions objectives. Those demands apply to governments as well as private oil traders.

The issue is also broader than Türkiye alone. Azerbaijan sells the crude, traders and shipping companies move it, and Israel purchases it. Responsibility for the flow is distributed across a chain of commercial and state actors. Treating Turkish transit as proof of a secret Turkish state sale would obscure that chain rather than expose it.

The facts that are established remain substantial: the embargo on direct Turkey–Israel trade has been publicly maintained; Israeli crude imports originating in Azerbaijan and loaded at Ceyhan rose sharply in 2025; and shipping intelligence has documented individual voyages to Israeli ports. Those facts justify scrutiny of the pipeline's role and of what Erdoğan's embargo can and cannot actually stop.

Sources and photo credit

The cover is a credited archival photograph; it is not a photo of the October 2026 announcement or events described. Publication date: October 21, 2026.

Reuters investigation, January 21, 2026: Israeli oil imports from Ceyhan, 94,000 bpd and tanker tracking — Read source

Turkish Trade Ministry, March 30, 2026: formal denial of continuing direct trade — Read source

Turkish Energy Ministry, November 10, 2024: BOTAŞ operator and third-country crude sales — Read source

Turkish Minute, October 6, 2026: withdrawn APA report on September ship calls — Read source

Official Turkish presidency, May 3, 2024: Erdoğan statement on halting trade with Israel — Read source

Archival Erdoğan photograph, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Phil Nijhuis, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0 — Read source

Photo licence, CC BY-SA 4.0 — Read source