
Brazil's New Right-Wing Congress Targets Labor Rights, Amazon and Supreme Court

BRASÍLIA — Brazil's newly elected Congress is shifting decisively toward the right ahead of the October 25 presidential runoff between Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro. The composition of the legislature could limit a Lula administration's agenda or give a Bolsonaro presidency a friendly legislative majority. The political struggle therefore extends beyond who occupies the presidential palace to who writes the laws affecting workers, Indigenous communities, public finances and the Amazon.
The key change is already visible in the seats won earlier this month. According to an October 22 Associated Press analysis, Bolsonaro's Liberal Party gained 23 seats in the 513-member Chamber of Deputies and nearly doubled its Senate representation. Lula's Workers' Party held approximately its previous strength. A collection of conservative and centrist factions can command a simple majority and, if sufficiently united, could approach the votes needed for constitutional changes.
The president is not the only prize
The runoff will settle the presidency, but it will not undo the October congressional results. Many of the elected lawmakers take office in February 2027. Brazil's party system makes parliamentary bargaining unavoidable: centrist and regional parties routinely negotiate support on bills, budgets and appointments. A centrist deputy's election is not evidence of automatic alignment with Bolsonaro, yet a broad conservative coalition can transform proposals into legislative votes when its factions choose to cooperate.
That arithmetic matters for everyday life. New laws can reshape workers' bargaining power, alter environmental permits, change how public enterprises operate and constrain social programs. The president can resist, negotiate or veto some legislation; a sufficiently broad legislative coalition can also contest vetoes and influence constitutional amendments. The headlines of a presidential campaign do not capture those deeper contests over the distribution of political power.
Labor rights and the economy in the firing line
Lawmakers associated with Bolsonaro favor lower corporate taxes, reduced public spending, deregulation and privatization. Some advocate more flexible labor contracts and a reversal of reforms they say burden businesses. Supporters present those changes as ways to encourage private investment, production and competitiveness. Critics argue that weakening labor rules and cutting services would shift costs from corporations onto workers and families.
The distinction between a campaign promise and a law is crucial. No unified spending-cut package has yet passed this newly elected Congress, and the lower and upper chambers are not identical blocs. But a legislative majority open to restrictions on social spending changes the balance of any future negotiations over wages, public health, education and income transfers. A presidential victory cannot guarantee an expansive social agenda without votes in Parliament.
The same applies to Brazil's debates over working time and platform labor. Legislative outcomes depend not only on what a president proposes, but also on committee leadership, legislative scheduling and bargaining among parties representing businesses, workers and regional interests. The incoming balance could reshape those decisions whether Lula or Bolsonaro occupies the presidential office.
Bolsonaro allies put the Supreme Court in their sights
Another priority is the country's Supreme Federal Court. Allies of Flávio Bolsonaro have called for the impeachment of Justice Alexandre de Moraes, who played a central role in the investigation leading to former President Jair Bolsonaro's imprisonment for an attempted coup. Impeaching a justice requires a supermajority in the Senate: 54 votes. The numbers make cross-party alliances central to any effort.
Other proposals involve restricting decisions issued by a single Supreme Court justice and discussing judicial term limits. Concerns about judicial accountability also exist outside the right, particularly after disputes and scandal involving the court. There is a legitimate debate about institutional checks; it is separate from using institutional reform as punishment against judges for specific cases. The content, sponsors and legal consequences of any proposal must be examined individually.

ARCHIVE PHOTO — National Congress in Brasília, 2 January 2023. Photographer: Sintegrity, CC BY-SA 4.0. The photograph depicts the building rather than the October 2026 election results.
The Amazon and Indigenous land rights face a new fight
Environmental organizations are alarmed by the congressional gains of legislators favoring mining and agribusiness expansion. Some have pushed weaker environmental licensing, less oversight of illegal land clearing, and amnesties for unauthorized land use. Advocates argue that faster approvals can create jobs and infrastructure, while critics warn that enforcement gaps invite deforestation and land conflict.
Brazil's Climate Observatory estimates that around 70 percent of the lower house and 80 percent of the Senate are hostile to environmental and climate priorities, figures reported by Associated Press and attributed to the organization rather than presented as independent classifications. Indigenous organizations fear that more legislators could back attempts to open protected lands to mining and delay the official recognition of territories.
Not every measure can become law through Congress alone. Brazil's constitution, federal courts, executive agencies and treaty obligations also shape the process. Yet an adverse legislative environment can obstruct land demarcation, frustrate oversight budgets and create pressure for changes that would make protections harder to enforce.
Human rights and foreign policy are also at stake
Right-wing lawmakers have promoted tougher criminal penalties, lowering the age of criminal responsibility and tighter restrictions on reproductive and transgender rights. Some favor a penal approach inspired by the mass-incarceration policies of El Salvador's government. Public-security reformers argue that severe penalties respond to widespread fear of violence. Their opponents question whether such punishments address low crime-solving rates, inequality and the roots of insecurity.
Several politicians also want Brazil to move further from China, its largest trading partner, and align more closely with U.S. President Donald Trump. Those positions collide with Brazil's existing commodity trade, industrial relationships and the government's language of economic sovereignty. Parliamentary committees and political pressure can influence foreign policy even when the executive remains formally responsible for diplomacy.
What October 25 will—and will not—decide
Brazilian voters will choose between two competing presidential programs on October 25. The election does not determine in advance how every senator or deputy will vote next year, nor does a coalition's potential numerical strength guarantee constitutional changes. It does, however, establish the environment in which social, labor, environmental and judicial battles will be fought.
The result is a structural challenge for any government promising to protect social rights while relying on a Congress tilted toward corporate deregulation and conservative cultural politics. Brazil's next major decisions will unfold in two arenas at once: the presidential administration and a legislature whose rightward shift is already settled by the ballot box. The precise legislative outcome will depend on the coalitions formed after lawmakers take office.



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