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China’s energy transition has reached a scale that changes the global climate equation. By mid-2026, renewable power accounted for more than 60 percent of China’s installed generating capacity, while wind and solar alone approached half of all power capacity. The political question is no longer whether China can build clean energy at scale. It is how quickly that buildout can displace fossil generation in actual electricity production. Solar panels. Wikimedia Commons. The buildout is now larger than the coal fleet in key measures China’s National Energy Administration reported that by June 2026 the country had 2.455 billion kilowatts of renewable capacity, equal to 60.7 percent of total installed power capacity. Wind and solar together reached roughly 1.95 billion kilowatts, while solar capacity alone was nearly level with coal-fired capacity. In the first half of 2026, renewables supplied 41.2 percent of national electricity generation. Wind and solar are no longer marginal additions to a coal system; they are becoming core infrastructure. State coordination made the scale possible China’s clean-energy expansion combines central targets, state-owned grids, public finance, industrial policy and fierce competition among manufacturers. That mix helped drive down the cost of solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles while expanding domestic deployment at extraordinary speed. Coal remains the contradiction Installed capacity is not the same as actual generation. Coal plants can run more continuously than solar and wind, and China still relies heavily on coal for energy security and grid balancing. The transition is therefore uneven: the clean system is expanding faster than the fossil system is disappearing. The global effect is already visible China’s manufacturing scale affects far more than its own emissions. Cheap Chinese solar modules, batteries and electric vehicles have lowered the cost of decarbonization worldwide. In Marxist terms, climate policy has become an industrial question: whoever controls the productive capacity for the energy transition shapes how quickly the rest of the world can move. Sources China National Energy Administration: renewable power development through June 2026 China National Energy Administration: 2025 renewable additions and 2026 priorities

The next United Nations secretary-general will take office on January 1 with an institution squeezed between two crises: declining capacity to shape major wars and a governance structure that still concentrates permanent Security Council power in the states that emerged dominant from World War II. Associated Press reporting after the General Assembly’s high-level week describes a U.N. facing deep financial pressure, major cuts to humanitarian and development work, and renewed demands to reform a Security Council in which the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France retain permanent seats and veto power. Africa, home to about 1.5 billion people, has no permanent seat. Neither does Latin America. Ghanaian President John Mahama told world leaders that Security Council reform is not a favor to Africa but an imperative for the legitimacy, credibility and survival of the United Nations. An institution built around unequal power The contradiction is structural. The General Assembly embodies formal sovereign equality, while the Security Council institutionalizes hierarchy. The five permanent members possess legal privileges that states representing most of humanity do not. That arrangement survived because the U.N. has never been a world government standing above power. It is an arena where power is negotiated, constrained and sometimes legitimized. The problem is that the distribution of global economic and political weight has changed far faster than the institution. Reform or managed decline The next secretary-general cannot rewrite the Charter alone. But the office can make the legitimacy gap impossible to ignore: press for representative expansion, defend multilateral law against selective enforcement, and use the Secretariat’s convening power where great-power diplomacy has failed. For the Global South, Security Council reform is not symbolic decoration. It is about whether countries that contain most of the world’s population remain rule-takers inside the body empowered to authorize sanctions, peace operations and the use of force. Source: Associated Press. Photo: Patrick Gruban, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.0.

The Communist Party of Swaziland has placed the kingdom’s long-running alliance with Taiwan directly inside its struggle against King Mswati III, arguing that Taipei’s diplomatic and economic relationship with the monarchy helps sustain an authoritarian political order. In a March 20 statement, the CPS condemned Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s planned April visit and described the relationship as support for the Tinkhundla monarchy. The party also reaffirmed its one-China position and framed opposition to Taiwanese diplomatic influence as inseparable from its campaigns against absolute monarchy and imperialism. Those ideological claims are the CPS’s own. The diplomatic stakes are real. Reuters reported in April that Eswatini is Taiwan’s last formal diplomatic ally in Africa and that Lai planned to visit the kingdom from April 22 to 26 for events surrounding Mswati’s four decades on the throne. The trip ultimately did not take place. Reuters later reported that Lai cancelled the journey after several African states withdrew or denied overflight permissions amid Chinese diplomatic pressure. Beijing praised adherence to the one-China principle, while Washington accused China of coercion. That episode shows why a small southern African monarchy carries disproportionate geopolitical weight. Pamphlets has previously examined how China’s expanding role in Africa changes bargaining power and development politics; Eswatini sits at the diplomatic edge of that contest because it remains the continent’s lone government formally recognising Taipei. For the CPS, however, the question is not only Beijing versus Taipei. Its argument is domestic: foreign alliances should be judged by whether they reinforce or weaken Mswati’s political system. By merging the one-China question with an anti-monarchy programme, Swaziland’s communists are turning one of Africa’s most unusual diplomatic relationships into part of their campaign for democratic and social transformation. Sources Communist Party of Swaziland — statement opposing the planned Lai visit Reuters — Taiwan president planned visit to Eswatini Reuters — planned trip cancelled after overflight denials

U.S. authorities arrested California resident Wanying Zhang at Los Angeles International Airport and charged her with acting as an unregistered foreign agent, alleging that she surveilled a son of Taiwan President Lai Ching-te on behalf of Chinese officials. Reuters reports that the FBI says Zhang traveled to Seattle in 2025 and sent Chinese officials photos, video and license-plate information connected to Lai’s son and his family. The allegations have not been tested at trial, and Zhang’s defense position was not immediately clear. Taiwan’s presidential office called the alleged conduct transnational repression. China’s Foreign Ministry said it was not familiar with the case and reiterated its opposition to what it described as sensationalized claims about Chinese spies. The political context The case lands in an already militarized U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan. Washington does not formally recognize Taiwan as a state, but remains its principal external arms supplier and political backer. Pamphlets recently examined the same rivalry through Washington’s China trade agenda and the resistance it encountered at the G20. That wider conflict matters here. An espionage prosecution is a legal proceeding against an individual; it is not evidence that every Chinese student, migrant or community organization is an arm of Beijing. At the same time, allegations of state-directed surveillance deserve factual scrutiny rather than dismissal by reflex. Why it matters The danger is that a narrow criminal case becomes raw material for a broader politics of suspicion. U.S.-China rivalry increasingly reaches into universities, migration policy, technology controls and diaspora life. The material conflict between two major powers is real; collective suspicion aimed at ordinary people is neither necessary nor defensible. Source: Reuters. Photo: Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), via Wikimedia Commons / Taiwan Government Open Information License.

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s general election is again producing a mixed political map: a left-leaning Bosniak moderate is leading for one seat on the country’s three-member presidency, while Serb and Croat nationalist candidates are ahead for the other two, according to preliminary results released after Sunday’s vote. Denis Bećirović of the Social Democratic Party is leading the race for the Bosniak seat. Željka Cvijanović of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats is ahead for the Serb seat, while Darijana Filipović of the Croatian Democratic Union is leading for the Croat position. Reuters reported the picture after more than 90 percent of polling stations had been counted. The result underlines the contradiction built into Bosnia’s postwar political system. Voters can back multi-ethnic or social-democratic parties, but the state presidency itself is divided into Bosniak, Serb and Croat seats under the constitutional framework created after the 1992–95 war. That structure continues to reward parties that organize politics through national identity. Turnout was low, at roughly 42 percent, reflecting widespread frustration with slow economic growth, corruption, political deadlock and a European Union accession process that has repeatedly stalled. Bosnia became an EU candidate in 2022 and was approved to open accession talks in 2024, but substantive negotiations have still not begun. The Serb result also keeps Milorad Dodik’s political network at the center of the country’s crisis. Dodik, who has repeatedly pushed for greater autonomy or secession for Republika Srpska and maintains close ties with Moscow, is barred from holding public office but remains the dominant figure in the SNSD. His ally Cvijanović is on course to retain the Serb seat in the state presidency. In the parallel race for president of Republika Srpska, SNSD candidate Savo Minić is also on course to win, according to the party. Dodik declared victory for his bloc even though he was not himself a candidate. The election was the first national vote to use a revamped electronic balloting system intended to reduce fraud. Technical delays were reported at some polling stations, but Bosnia’s Central Election Commission proceeded with preliminary results on Sunday night. The larger political problem remains unresolved: Bosnia’s institutions are designed to balance three national communities but have struggled to produce stable common government or a coherent economic program. The preliminary results suggest voters have strengthened a moderate social-democratic current among Bosniaks without dislodging the nationalist machines that dominate Serb and Croat politics. That leaves the country with a presidency likely to combine sharply different projects: a pro-European social democrat, a Serb nationalist bloc aligned with Dodik and Russia, and a Croat nationalist representative. Whether that arrangement can move Bosnia toward economic reform and EU integration—or simply reproduce another cycle of institutional paralysis—will depend on the parliamentary coalitions formed after the final count. Sources: Reuters — leftist and nationalist candidates lead Bosnia’s tripartite presidency vote · AP — Bosnia vote leaves nationalist forces strong amid EU and economic pressures · Bosnia and Herzegovina Central Election Commission — preliminary results and turnout

The Communist Party of Britain has expelled Marxist economist and computer scientist Paul Cockshott, opening a dispute over internal democracy, political discipline and the boundaries of dissent inside one of Britain's longstanding communist organisations. Cockshott says he was informed of his expulsion on October 3. In an account published the following day, he said party officials accused him of antisemitism and conspiracy rhetoric, support for the American Communist Party, breaches of confidentiality and the disciplinary process, violations of the party's Social Media Protocol, and unsanctioned involvement with Young Communist League educational material. Cockshott disputes each allegation. His central argument is not merely that he disagrees with the party's judgment, but that the conduct alleged does not clearly correspond to the constitutional rules and social-media clauses officials said he violated. The dispute over the ACP One of the most politically significant accusations concerns Cockshott's attitude toward the American Communist Party. He says investigators treated favourable comments, likes and reposts concerning the organisation as evidence of factional activity. Cockshott says he neither organised nor participated in organising an ACP meeting in Britain. He acknowledges writing privately to the Communist Party's Scottish office opposing the cancellation of a proposed meeting and says he told investigators that he supported communists in other countries. His account argues that officials identified no constitutional rule prohibiting members from expressing support for a foreign communist organisation. Antisemitism and the Golders Green attack The most serious allegation is antisemitism. Cockshott says it arose principally from material he reposted concerning the March arson attack that destroyed four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green, London. The attack itself is not in dispute. What Cockshott disputes is the disciplinary meaning attached to commentary he circulated questioning official claims about the perpetrators, their motives and alleged foreign links. He argues that reposting journalists or academics who challenge a government account is not, by itself, evidence of antisemitism. Criticism of a state, a political movement or an official security narrative cannot automatically be collapsed into hostility toward an ethnic or religious population. At the same time, a communist organisation has every reason to treat genuine antisemitism as a serious disciplinary matter. The relevant question is therefore narrower: what specific statements crossed that line, and what evidence established it? Cockshott's answer is that the party did not demonstrate that case. That remains his account; Pamphlets has not independently reviewed the CPB's internal investigatory report, hearing transcript or expulsion decision. A fight over process as well as politics Cockshott also challenges the disciplinary process itself. He says he was accused of breaching confidentiality after publicly noting that he had been suspended without being told why, and of improperly recording a disciplinary meeting after using speech-to-text software to produce a transcript. He further says he repeatedly requested the Social Media Protocol relied upon against him but did not receive access during much of the process. These are not trivial procedural complaints. A political party can impose discipline, but discipline is strongest when rules are knowable in advance, charges are tied to specific provisions and members have a meaningful opportunity to answer the evidence against them. Why Cockshott's expulsion matters Cockshott is not a marginal figure in Marxist intellectual life. A computer scientist and political economist associated with the University of Glasgow, he is best known for co-authoring Towards a New Socialism, an influential attempt to connect modern computing with democratic economic planning. Cockshott's record as a Marxist economist gives this expulsion significance beyond a dispute over one membership card. The political issue is how a communist party disciplines a prominent thinker over international political associations and contested commentary—and whether it can publicly justify the rules it applied. Democratic centralism is not simply centralism. It depends on political debate, clear rules and collective decisions that members can understand before they are expected to obey them. If controversial positions can be transformed into disciplinary offences after the fact, the distinction between party unity and bureaucratic exclusion starts to erode. As of October 5, Pamphlets could not locate a public Communist Party statement specifically answering Cockshott's account. Until the party publishes a substantive explanation or the evidence on which it relied, the most detailed public record of the dispute remains Cockshott's own statement and should be read as such. What is already clear is that the CPB has expelled one of Britain's better-known Marxist political economists in a dispute that raises larger questions about internal democracy, factionalism and the limits of acceptable disagreement. Whether the decision is ultimately understood as justified discipline or bureaucratic exclusion will depend on evidence the party has yet to put before the public. Hero image: Paul Cockshott. Photo: World Association for Political Economy/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0.

At the 81st United Nations General Assembly, support for Palestinian political rights was not confined to one African bloc or one ideological camp. Governments from North, West, East and Southern Africa used the same week to defend Palestinian statehood, self-determination, an end to occupation or a two-state settlement based on international law. Palestinian flag near United Nations headquarters during UN high-level week. SWinxy/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0. The diplomatic pattern was broad Pamphlets reviewed explicit statements delivered during the September 22–28, 2026 high-level week and related Palestine-focused meetings. Fifteen African governments in that record publicly backed Palestinian statehood, self-determination or a negotiated settlement ending occupation: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Comoros, the Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, South Africa, Sudan and Tunisia. The language varied, but the core demand repeated across regions: Palestinians were treated as a people with political rights, not simply as recipients of humanitarian relief. Several governments explicitly referred to the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem; others emphasized sovereignty, self-determination, international law or an end to occupation. North Africa: statehood and the end of occupation Algeria reaffirmed what it called full and unconditional support for Palestinian rights and an independent sovereign state with Al-Quds al-Sharif as its capital. Egypt tied peace to a settlement that ends occupation and creates an independent Palestinian state on the June 4, 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Morocco likewise described Palestinian statehood as a constant foreign-policy priority, while Tunisia reiterated support for an independent and fully sovereign Palestinian state. Libya framed the issue through decades of occupation and repression and backed the Palestinian people’s right to a state under international law. Sudan called for Palestinian self-determination, statehood and refugee rights under international resolutions. West and Central Africa: a political settlement, not permanent war Burkina Faso backed coexistence between Israel and Palestine through a lasting political settlement consistent with international law. Ghana reaffirmed support for recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state within a viable two-state framework. Niger also backed two states living side by side in peace, security and dignity, while the Republic of the Congo placed Palestine within its broader call for negotiated political settlements. East and Southern Africa: solidarity and self-determination Djibouti described its solidarity with Palestinians as unwavering and backed a sovereign state based on the 1967 borders. Mauritius emphasized the inalienable right to self-determination. Namibia connected Palestinian statehood to freedom and self-determination, while South Africa argued that Palestinian rights and dignity cannot be treated as conditional. The Marxist question is political agency A material reading of these speeches focuses on agency. Humanitarian aid can keep people alive, but it does not answer who controls land, borders, movement, security and political institutions. The recurring African position at UNGA was that Palestine is a political question involving sovereignty and self-determination, not only a humanitarian emergency. The fifteen governments did not use identical language and should not be treated as a unified ideological bloc. What they shared was a refusal to reduce Palestine to relief alone. Their statements placed statehood, political rights and international law at the center of the debate. Sources United Nations General Assembly, 81st session: speeches and statements United Nations: Palestine-related materials from UNGA 81 high-level week

German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier used the anniversary of reunification to warn that the country risks divisions reminiscent of the Weimar Republic, arguing that extremist rhetoric and organized disinformation are corroding democratic debate. The warning follows eastern state elections in which the Alternative for Germany took the largest vote share, while Berlin was won by The Left. The parties are politically opposed, but the results share one feature: a widening rejection of the parties that managed Germany’s post-reunification political center. Reuters reported that Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democratic coalition has been shaken by voter anxiety over economic decline and living standards. Germany’s government is now expected to raise its 2026 growth forecast, but the recovery remains uneven and private consumption and corporate investment are still weak. Political legitimacy does not erode in an economic vacuum. That does not make the far right less dangerous. It does make a purely moral explanation of polarization incomplete. If democratic politics is reduced to condemning disinformation while wages, public services, housing costs and regional inequalities remain unresolved, the institutions being defended can continue losing authority even as officials warn about the consequences. Germany’s postwar democratic settlement rested on more than constitutional rules. It also rested on a material promise: stability, rising prosperity and a political center able to reproduce both. As that promise weakens, the struggle over Germany’s future increasingly turns on who gets blamed for decline and who can present a credible alternative to it. Photo: Reinhard Dietrich / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0. Image shows President Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Worms, Germany.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has called for the restoration of dialogue and trust with North Korea while pairing that diplomatic appeal with a plan to reduce Seoul’s long-term military dependence on the United States. Speaking on Armed Forces Day, Lee said South Korea should pursue renewed communication with Pyongyang even as tensions remain high following a mine explosion in the Demilitarized Zone that injured South Korean soldiers. North Korea has rejected Seoul’s accusation that it was responsible for the blast. At the same time, Lee reaffirmed his government’s goal of transferring wartime operational control of South Korean forces from the U.S.-led command structure to Seoul. The issue has remained unresolved for decades despite repeated South Korean governments pledging to complete the transfer. The proposal is not a withdrawal from the U.S. alliance. Lee’s government continues to support military cooperation with Washington, but argues that South Korea should have greater authority over its own armed forces in wartime and develop more of the capabilities required for independent defense. Lee also announced a broad military modernization program that includes plans for nuclear-powered submarines by the mid-2030s, expanded missile-defense systems, artificial-intelligence technology and laser interceptors. The government says these investments are intended to strengthen deterrence while reducing structural dependence on outside command. That dual approach—dialogue with the North and greater military autonomy for the South—differs from policies that treat inter-Korean relations almost entirely through the lens of U.S.-led deterrence. Lee has repeatedly argued that reducing the risk of war requires both credible defense and political channels capable of managing crises. Pyongyang has so far shown little interest in reopening talks. North Korean officials have rejected Seoul’s recent outreach and increasingly describe the South as a hostile state rather than a partner in eventual reunification. The mine dispute has sharpened those tensions. South Korea and the United Nations Command say the September incident violated the armistice, while North Korea has called the accusation fabricated and warned against interference with its fortification work along the border. Lee’s strategy therefore faces pressure from both directions: a North Korean government refusing dialogue and a military relationship with Washington whose command structure South Korea has spent years trying to rebalance. Whether Seoul can build a more autonomous defense while lowering tensions may become one of the defining tests of his presidency. Source: Reuters — South Korea’s Lee urges North Korea to restore dialogue, pledges military buildup

On April 12, 1961, Yuri Gagarin completed one orbit of Earth in 108 minutes and became the first human in space. The flight turned a Soviet engineering program into a global symbol of what a state-directed scientific system could accomplish under extreme technological pressure. Yuri Gagarin in 1961. Wikimedia Commons. Vostok 1 made human spaceflight real NASA records that Vostok 1 circled Earth at roughly 27,400 kilometers per hour and completed the historic mission in 108 minutes. Gagarin ejected from the capsule during descent and landed by parachute, as planned. The achievement was institutional, not individual Gagarin became the public face of the mission, but Vostok depended on thousands of engineers, technicians, physicians, factory workers and military personnel. Human spaceflight emerged from a publicly organized scientific-industrial system capable of coordinating rocketry, medicine, communications and manufacturing at national scale. The space race was also a competition between development systems The United States answered with its own massive public investment in NASA and the Apollo program. The result was not a simple proof that one economic system had permanently defeated another. It showed that spaceflight itself depended on states mobilizing scientific labor and industrial resources on a scale private markets had not previously produced. Gagarin’s legacy is collective capacity Gagarin’s flight remains historically important because it transformed the boundary of the possible. The first human orbit was a personal act of courage built on a much larger achievement: society organizing science, labor and industry around a goal no human institution had accomplished before. A public program turned prestige into technical capacity The Soviet space program also produced capabilities that extended beyond prestige: launch vehicles, satellite systems, tracking networks, materials research and trained scientific labor. Vostok was one mission inside a larger state-directed technological system whose military and civilian applications shaped the Cold War economy. Sources NASA Science: Yuri Gagarin, first human in space Encyclopaedia Britannica: Yuri Gagarin and Vostok 1

Iran went through the 2026 World Cup without losing a group match and still went home. Three draws left the team dependent on results elsewhere, and Austria’s stoppage-time equalizer against Algeria pushed Iran out of the round of 32. The sporting result was legitimate. The political conditions around Iran’s participation were far less ordinary. Azteca Stadium during the 2026 World Cup. Wikimedia Commons. Visa politics entered the tournament before kickoff Iran originally planned to base its team in Arizona. Visa uncertainty changed that. FIFA approved a move to Tijuana, Mexico, after the Iranian federation raised concerns about U.S. entry restrictions and the treatment of its delegation. Reuters reported that players eventually received visas, while some staff faced delays or denials. The logistical consequences were concrete. Iran trained in Mexico and crossed into the United States for matches under restrictions that limited how early the team could enter. U.S. officials later eased one of those rules before Iran’s final group game, allowing the delegation to arrive earlier than initially permitted. Unbeaten, but eliminated On the field, Iran drew all three matches against New Zealand, Belgium and Egypt. Three points were not enough to guarantee advancement under the expanded tournament format. AP reported that Iran appeared set to advance on the final group-stage day until Austria equalized against Algeria in stoppage time, changing the ranking of third-place teams. That is a brutal way to exit a tournament, but it is not evidence of a fixed match. The result came from the competition format. The stronger criticism lies elsewhere: a team representing a sanctioned geopolitical rival of the host country entered the World Cup under unusual mobility constraints before a ball was kicked. Global sport is never outside politics FIFA presents the World Cup as a universal competition, but states still control borders, visas and security. That gives host governments material power over who can enter, how delegations move and what conditions teams face. In Iran’s case, those powers became part of tournament preparation. A Marxist analysis of sport starts from that institutional reality. Global tournaments generate enormous commercial value and claim political neutrality, yet they operate through states, border regimes, sponsors and governing bodies with unequal power. Iran’s experience is a clear example of how geopolitical conflict can enter the supposedly neutral space of sport through logistics rather than the scoreboard. Politics reached the tournament before kickoff Iran left the World Cup unbeaten after a late goal ended its hopes of advancing. The sporting result stands on its own. The political scandal lay in documented visa restrictions and travel rules that shaped who could participate and under what conditions before the first whistle. Washington’s control over entry was already part of the tournament’s power structure. Sources Reuters: Iran moves World Cup base from Arizona to Tijuana over visa uncertainty Reuters: U.S. eases restrictions on Iran’s World Cup team Associated Press: Iran eliminated after Austria’s late equalizer

The world economy looks very different depending on how it is measured. At market exchange rates, the United States remains the larger economy. At purchasing-power parity, IMF data place China ahead. That gap between the two measures is not statistical trivia—it reveals the difference between the geography of production and the geography of financial power. Leaders at the 17th BRICS Summit. Wikimedia Commons. PPP measures production in local purchasing power Purchasing-power parity adjusts for differences in local prices. A haircut, apartment, meal or construction project can cost very different amounts in Shanghai, Delhi and New York. PPP tries to compare how much real output currencies can buy inside their own economies rather than simply converting everything at foreign-exchange rates. That makes PPP especially useful for comparing the scale of domestic production and consumption. In the IMF’s April 2026 World Economic Outlook data, emerging and developing economies together account for more than 60 percent of world GDP at PPP. China is the largest national economy on that measure. Nominal GDP measures a different kind of power Market-exchange-rate GDP matters when states and firms need to buy goods priced internationally, service foreign debt or acquire assets abroad. The dollar’s role in global finance gives the United States forms of monetary and financial leverage that a PPP comparison cannot capture. This is why asking whether China has 'overtaken' the United States has no single answer. China is larger by PPP output; the United States remains larger at market exchange rates and occupies the central position in the global dollar system. Different measures describe different material capacities. BRICS reflects the shift in production The rise of BRICS is politically significant because its members include large producers, commodity exporters, industrial economies and major population centers outside the traditional G7 core. Their combined weight is especially visible in PPP measures, which give greater emphasis to the volume of goods and services produced in lower-price economies. BRICS is not a single economy and cannot simply add its GDP together as if it were a federal state. Its members have different currencies, class structures, trade interests and development strategies. But the group’s expansion reflects a real shift: a larger share of world production now takes place outside the old North Atlantic core. Production has moved faster than financial power A Marxist reading puts the two measures together. PPP shows where enormous quantities of labor, infrastructure and industrial output are concentrated. Nominal GDP and currency power show who can command resources across borders and whose financial institutions set the terms of global exchange. The major story of the twenty-first-century economy is that production has shifted toward Asia and the Global South faster than global finance, reserve currencies and institutional power have shifted with it. The tension between those two maps is one of the material foundations of multipolarity. Sources IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2026 IMF DataMapper: GDP based on PPP, share of world IMF: World Economic Outlook frequently asked questions on PPP weights